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Simulation of a Group Incentive
Program for Farmer Adoption of Best
Management Practices
Viju C. Ipe, Eric A. DeVuyst, John B. Braden, and David C. White
A group incentive program to encoumge farmer adoption of best management practices is
simulated for a typical watershed in central Illinois. The incentive payments, program costs
and environmental impacts of the program are simulated. The results show that the best
management practices may not actually reduce farm profits but may increase farm profits and
reduce environmental pollution. The sponsor in most cases may not have to pay anything
under the incentive contract. This may bring about a win-win situation for the sponsor, the
farmer participating in the program, and society as a whole. The program could be
implemented as an educational effort to demonstrate the benefits of sound management
practices.
Improvement in quality of our waters for safe use
is a policy priority in both the national and regional
environmental programs. Having achieved signifi-
cant progress in the control of pollution from point
sources, future improvements in water quality lin-
ger largely on the pollution reduction from non-
point sources (U.S. EPA 1995). Among the non-
point sources, the major pollutants are the runoff of
fertilizers and pesticides from agricultural fields.
When individual farmer actions are not observable
(moral hazard), it may not be possible to enforce
strict control measures like a tax or fine on pollu-
tion. A tax on the polluting input however may not
be feasible since a very high tax rate may be re-
quired to achieve desired objectives. In a study of
Indiana farmers, Randhir and Lee (1997) observed
that a tax rate up to about 400% on nitrogen fer-
tilizer may be required to reduce nitrogen pollution
by 190. Best Management Practices (BMP) have
often been proposed as method of Nonpoint Source
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Pollution (NPS) pollution control. Some BMPs, in
addition to their environmental advantages may in-
crease farm profits (Cooper and Keim 1996). How-
ever, farmer adoption may be low because they
will not capture the full benefits of BMP adoption
(Duttweiler and Nicholson 1983). Further, farmers
may be skeptical about the profitability of BMPs.
Hence, incentives may be needed to promote adop-
tion of BMPs. DeVuyst and Ipe (1999) proposed a
group incentive contract which will encourage
adoption of pollution abatement practices and
demonstrated the elimination of moral hazard un-
der the proposed program. This paper builds on
their work by demonstrating the potential for eco-
nomic as well as environmental benefits of the pro-
gram for a watershed. Using mathematical simula-
tion, the program payments, costs of implementing
the program, and the resulting environmental im-
provement are illustrated for a watershed in Illi-
nois.
The objectives of this paper are to simulate and
demonstrate a group incentive program for adop-
tion of best management practices in a typical wa-
tershed in Central Illinois facing water quality
problems due to nitrates and analyze the costs and
environmental benefits of the program. The man-
agement practices considered are changing the tim-
ing of fertilizer application and reducing the appli-
cation rate. The hypothesis here is that the pro-
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posed incentive program is a win-win situation
where both the farmer and the program sponsor
benefit.
Definition of the Incentive Program
The program guarantees the farmers who adopt the
BMP at least the same level of profit on average as
those who do not adopt the practice. Thus, the
program compensates the farmers for the loss in
profits, if any, due to program participation. Under
the program there are two groups of farmers. Those
farmers who adopt the practice are designated the
participating farmers and those who do not adopt
the practice are designated the non-participating
farmers. Both groups of farmers are assumed to be
in a watershed or neighboring watersheds with
similar soil and climatic conditions. The program
first calculates the long-run average and current
average profit for the two groups of farmers. Then
the percentage deviation of the current group av-
erages from the respective long-run averages are
computed for the two groups. The participating
farmers receive the incentive payment when the
percentage deviation (from the long-run average)
for the participating farmers is below the percent-
age deviation for the non-participating farmers. A
mathematical definition of the payment scheme is
presented below. The incentive scheme is similar
to the group crop insurance plan or Group Risk
Plan, where the insured farmers are compensated
when the county average yield falls below a trigger
yield (Banquet and Skees 1994).
Let A be the desired management practice in
order to achieve the environmental objective.
Then, the current year, t, profit of a farmer i who
adopts the desired level of abatement is denoted as
IT?(A), where p refers to participation, Let there be
G farmers participating in the incentive program.
For a group of G participating farmers adopting the
desired level of abatement, the curreqt group av-
eragg profit is represented as R: (A) = Z:=,
IT~f(A)/G. The nonparticipating farmers choose
management practices which maximize their ex-
pected profits based on their subjective beliefs. Let
Af represent the management practice chosen by
the non-participants. Then the current year, t, profit
of an individual farmer not participating in the pro-
gram is denoted as mj(A~), where n refers to a
non-participating farmer. The management prac-
tice followed by non-participants is assumed to be
unaffected by the abatement practice followed by
the participants. Let there be H farmers in the non-
participating group. Then, the current group aver-
age profit for the non-participating farmers is ii;
(A*) = X7=, T;(Aj*EO.
The program is based also on the long-run av-
erage profits of the two groups of farmers, which
need to be defined. Let the long-run average profits
of a farmer, i, participating in~he program be rep-
resented as fr$’~ = ~~= , nit(Ai)/T, where T is the
long-run time period considered. Then the long-inn
group average profit for the participating farmers
may be represented as ir~~ = Z?= I T~RIG. Let the
long-run average profit of the j’th nonparticipating
farmer be ti~~ = X:., n;,({j*)fT and th~ c?;
spending group average profit is fr~R ~=
T&/H. The incentive payment is defined as in
DeVuyst and Ipe (1999):
where, ti~R is the long-run group average profit of
the participating farmers, Yrf’is the current group
average profit of the participating farmers, ti~~ is
the long-run group average profit of the non-
participating farmers, and 7r~ is the current group
average profit of the non-participating farmers.
It is assumed that the yields and nitrogen man-
agement practices followed by the participating
farmers are observable and that both groups of
farmers are risk averse. The assumption that nitro-
gen application levels can be observed is the core
element of the program. This may be justified be-
cause the custom application of fertilizers and use
of computerized application equipment is increas-
ing in the Midwest. The program participants could
be farmers who choose to employ custom applica-
tion of fertilizers and computerized application
equipment. The participants would also be required
to reveal the records of the applicators and yields
to the program sponsor. The other management
practices like pesticide applications are, however,
unobservable and moral hazard arises if the par-
ticipating farmers fail to adopt the specified man-
agement practices and enjoy compensation. De-
Vuyst and Ipe (1999) show that since the incentive
scheme is based on group average profits, there is
no moral hazard arising from such unobservable
actions. They show that the optimal strategies in
the absence of the incentive program are still op-
timal with the incentive program.
Our incentive program exploits correlated risks.
It is assumed that the yields of the farmers within
each group are correlated among themselves and
thus with the averages. As the correlations in-Ipe et al. Farmer Adoplion of Best Management Practices 141
crease, the program becomes more effective. Since
the incentive payment is based on relative devia-
tions in profits, the correlated risks can be ex-
ploited to eliminate the possibility of participating
farmers getting compensated due to random factors
like adverse weather or pests.
Our program is not budget balancing. It is pro-
posed as an incentive payment scheme which in-
sures the participating farmers at least the same
level of profits as the non-participating group of
farmers. In other words, the incentive scheme com-
pensates the farmers for the loss in profits, it any,
due to adoption of best management practices. This
could be used as an educational effort to educate
farmers about the benefits, private and social, from
adopting best management practices. We expect
that once the farmers start to realize the benefits of
better nitrogen fertilizer management they will
adopt such practices voluntarily.
Data
The program is simulated for the Lake Decatur
watershed in Central Illinois. The city of Decatur
depends on the water from Lake Decatur for its
drinking water. The water in the lake is affected by
nitrate pollution from agricultural activities in this
watershed. Hence the Lake Decatur watershed and
the lake offer a perfect site for simulating the pro-
gram and assessing the economic and environmen-
tal impacts, Two different management practices
are considered in this study, Nitrogen fertilizers
applied in spring tend to be less polluting than
when applied in fall (Illinois Agronomy Hand-
book). Hence changing the time of fertilizer appli-
cation from fall to spring is one of the management
practices considered in this study, The second
BMP considered is reducing the quantity of nitro-
gen fertilizer applied. In order to model the crop
growth and nitrate emissions in the watershed, the
Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator-Water
Quality, (EPIC) is used. Following White et al.
(1998), a sample of five soil types is selected to
represent the whole watershed. A transect sam-
pling procedure is first used to make an inventory
of soils in the watershed. The watershed is first
subdivided into several sub-watersheds and a list
of the soil types is prepared for each sub-basin.
Two to four transects are then drawn across each
sub-basin. The results of each of the sub-watershed
are then added to provide an inventory of the soils
for the entire watershed. A total of 53 soil types are
identified by this approach. They were then
grouped according to their similarities of texture,
natural internal drainage, and productivity when
drained. Then, a sample of five soil types was se-
lected so as to reflect both the predominant, as well
as some of the less common soils, in the watershed.
The predominance of the soil type, geographic
separation, and availability of detailed profile in-
formation needed by EPIC are other considerations
that are important to the final selection of the
sample of five soil types. The selected soil types
are Drummer, Sable, Ashkum, Catlin, and Elliot.
Yields and nitrate emissions from corn grown un-
der corn-soybean rotation and mulch till systems
are simulated using EPIC. The fertilizer applica-
tion times considered are fall application, spring
application, and side dress application. The simu-
lations use the weather patterns in Farmer City, the
weather station closest to the center of the water-
shed. This is the only weather station within the
watershed with the required data to run EPIC simu-
lations. Typically, a farmer will have a mixture of
soil types. In order to compute the program pay-
ments and annual emissions, the EPIC simulations
for the five soil types are first pooled together as-
suming that Drummer account for 339Z0of the total
area, Elliot 22?Z0,Catlin 2090, Sable 1490 and Ash-
kum 11%. The proportional representation of the
soil types is based on the predominance of the soils
in the watershed (White et al. 1998).
In order to simulate the program, the practices of
the non-participating farmers referred to in the rest
of paper as baseline application rates were defined
first. This was done in such a way that the practices
closely resemble the current practices followed by
most farmers in this watershed. There is ample
evidence that farmers apply nitrogen at rates higher
than the recommended rates. A survey of the fer-
tilizer management practices in the watershed
shows that most farmers apply nitrogen fertilizers
at rates higher than the recommended rate (United
States Department of Agriculture, Soil Conserva-
tion Water District, Champaign County. Unpub-
lished survey of the Big Ditch watershed. 1995).
The above survey shows that 80% of the farmers
apply at least 20’?ZO more nitrogen than is recom-
mended. Further, studies by Bullock and Bullock
(1994) show that agronomic recommendations are
as much as 97% above the expected profit-
maximizing level for one Illinois location and
roughly equal to it at another location. In the case
of Drummer soil type, the Illinois Agronomy
Handbook recommends a nitrogen application rate
of 193 pounds/acre for a corn: nitrogen price ratio
of 15:1. The corresponding rate for Sable is 198
pounds/acre, Catlin (193 pounds/acre), and Elliot
and Ashkum (153– 163 poundslacre). When corn is
grown after soybeans, the Handbook recommends
a downward adjustment of nitrogen application142 October 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
rates by about 40 poundslacre. Based on the above
results; Illinois Agronomy Handbook recommen-
dations; discussion with the field staffs of the Illi-
nois Farm Business and Farm Management Asso-
ciation (FBFM); and information from the Illinois
Cooperative Extension Service, the following
baseline application rates (lbs/acre) were defined:
Ashkum 150, Catlin 175, Drummer 175, Elliot
150, and Sable 200. Seventy-five percent of the
total nitrogen is applied in fall and the rest in
spring. The abatement practices suggested are re-
ducing the quantity of fertilizer applied and chang-
ing the time of fertilizer application. In order to
define the management practices four alternative
scenarios are defined as follows:
Scenario 1: Nitrogen application is done in the fall
and spring: 75% in fall and 25YOin spring.
Scenario 2: One-half of the total nitrogen is applied
in fall and one-half in spring.
Scenario 3: 75% of the total nitrogen fertilizer is
applied in the spring and 25~0 in the fall.
Scenario 4: 25~0 of the total nitrogen is fall ap-
plied, 50% spring applied, and the remaining 25%
is side dressed.
Under each of the four scenarios reductions in ni-
trogen application at the increments of 5 lbs/acre
from the baseline are considered. Thus, the man-
agement practice of a non-participant can be char-
acterized as nitrogen applied at the baseline rates
under scenario 1. A movement from scenario 1 to
scenarios 2, 3, and 4 without any reduction in ni-
trogen application rates represents reduction in the
share of nitrogen applied in fall. The program pay-
ments and the annual emissions of nitrates under
participation and non-participation are then com-
puted for all combinations of the four different
scenarios and reductions in nitrogen application
rates.
The yield response models in EPIC were first
calibrated for the specific soils selected and for the
Decatur watershed area based on yield response
observed at the experimental stations and the
county level data. The calibrated EPIC program is
then used to simulate crop growth and emissions
for a total period of eighty years for all combina-
tions of soil types, fertilizer application times, and
application rates. The data for the first forty years
are used to establish the long-run average profits.
Both groups are assumed to have the same histori-
cal long-run average profits. The data for the sec-
ond set of forty years are used to simulate the
expected incentive payments, the program costs,
and the water quality impacts. The simulation cap-
tures the major sources of variability in farm prof-
its, The hypothesis here is that variability in
weather conditions, and output prices are the major
sources of variability in farm profits. A recent sur-
vey of agricultural producers across twelve states
shows that the most important source of variability
in farm profits is the weather followed by output
prices (Fleisher 1990). The simulations for a period
of forty years account for the variability due to
weather conditions. In order to account for the
variability due to output prices, a ten-year series of
corn prices collected from the USDA Feed Situa-
tion and Outlook Yearbook (1999) is used to cal-
culate the returns and profits. The ten year price
series is then replicated for each of the forty years.
The distributions of revenues are obtained by as-
suming that yields and prices are independently
distributed for a particular watershed. The costs of
fertilizer application alone are considered as all
other costs are assumed to be the same for both the
groups of farmers. Phosphorous and potassium fer-
tilizer application rates are those recommended by
the University of Illinois Agronomy Handbook; 65
and 45 pounds per acre respectively. Nitrogen is
priced at $0.20 per pound and phosphorus and po-
tassium at $0.24 and $0.13 respectively (Univer-
sity of Illinois FaRMLab). Since the effect of fer-
tilizer prices on variability of the farm profits are
negligible (Fleisher 1999), a series for fertilizer
prices is not used in this study. The simulated
model is dynamic as the simulations run through
forty years and the variability in prices is incorpo-
rated by replicating simulations for each of the
forty years using the ten year price series. The
results reported here are summary measures of
those 400 data points.
In order to analyze the impacts of the program
on the water quality in the lake, the EPIC simula-
tion results are translated into nitrate concentration
in the lake water using a hydrology model devel-
oped by White et al. (1998). The daily records of
the amount of water and nitrate that are being vec-
tored out of the soil column as surface water, shal-
low groundwater and tile flow for a period of 40
years obtained from the EPIC simulations are used
to approximate the hydrology of the watershed as a
nitrate delivery model. The EPIC outputs of five
simulated soil columns are translated into nitrate
concentrations in the lake through a series of nu-
merical model calibrations. The first step in the
calibration is computing weighted averages for
EPIC outputs relevant to the quantity and nitrate
content of surface, subsurface, and tile water flows.
The weights were assigned to reflect the extent of
each of the soil types, and soil specific fertilizer
application rates needed to comprise the base case
management scenario for the watershed as a whole.Ipe et al. Farmer Adoption of Best Management Practices 143
In the second step, spatial dynamics is incorporated
by specifying lags between rainfall and water re-
leased from drain tiles to become surface flow as a
distributed lag. The distributed lag is modeled after
a hydrography obtained from monitoring a field tile
draining approximately 100 acres (David et al.
1994). The lag structure spreads each daily output
of water and nitrate over fourteen days in such a
way that it increases the flow for five days and then
decreases for nine days. The weighted averages
obtained from the distributed lag model are then
calibrated to emulate the actual observations mea-
sured by the Illinois State Water Survey (1996).
The intended yearly variability is then incorporated
by normalizing the monthly surface flow to the
long-term average but allowing to vary from year-
to-year in proportion to the deviation of the
monthly total precipitation in that year from the
normal. The normalized monthly surface flow is
calculated as the ratio of monthly total precipita-
tion to the long-run monthly average precipitation
normalized by the long-run average monthly sur-
face flow. The White et al. (1998) model then
simulates the weekly nitrate concentration of the
“river flow” as a function of the weekly simulated
tile flow, the volume of the average monthly sub-
surface flows recorded by the Illinois State Water
Survey, and the adjusted monthly surface flow. In
the next step the mixing of the incoming river wa-
ter with the water already in the lake is modeled.
This dynamic process is approximated as
RCW * (Qw + SSFW) + LCW.l * LV
LCW =
Qw + SSFW + LV
where LCW is the lake concentration in week w,
RCW is the river concentration in week w, QWis the
runoff in week w, SSFW is the subsurface flow in
week w, and LV is the lake volume, The model
now yielded reasonably realistic 40-year averages
of weekly nitrate concentrations in the lake. In or-
der for the lake concentration to better mimic the
actual observations a final calibration was per-
formed. This was done by differentially adjusting
the lake concentration based on how much they
differ from the median. The adjustment is made in
such a way that the pattern generated by plotting
each simulated maximum annual concentration
against the likelihood of it being exceeded com-
pares reasonably with similar patterns based on
actual recorded data on lake concentration.
The study area is a 956.9 square mile watershed,
which is the drainage area of Lake Decatur.
Eighty-seven percent of the total area is under row
crops, half of which is corn and the rest soybeans,
3% small grains and hay and the rest in non-
agricultural uses. Since drainage under natural con-
ditions is poor, extensive areas of the watershed are
artificially drained. A forty-year database of simu-
lated weekly lake nitrate concentrations is first pro-
duced at the baseline nitrogen application rates and
timing. Similar data of weekly lake nitrate concen-
trations for reductions in nitrogen application rates
by 25 pounds and 50 pounds from the baseline for
the four different scenarios are then produced. It is
assumed that 989toof the total corn acreage is under
corn-soybean rotation and the rest under continu-
ous-corn. The simulated forty year weekly average
concentrations are then used to compute the prob-
ability of nitrate concentrations exceeding the 10
mgfl level for the different reductions in nitrogen
application rates considered.
Program Simulation
Simulated programs under the four different sce-
narios are presented in this section. In the first
scenario, the only management practice considered
is a reduction in nitrogen application rates. In sce-
narios 2–4, the fertilizer application time is
changed along with reductions in application rates.
The expected payment, E (I), the minimum pay-
ment, Min (I), the maximum payment, Max (I),
variance of the payment, Var (I), expected profits,
E (m), expected total profits with the incentive pay-
ment, E (IT+ I), variance of profit, Var (IT), and the
variance of the total profits, Var (T + I) under
Scenario 1 are reported in table 1, The expected
profits and the variance of the profits under non-
participation are presented in the first row of the
table. The expected payment ranges from $0.02 per
acre for five pound-reduction per acre in nitrogen
application rate to $1.43 per acre when the appli-
cation rate is reduced by 50 pounds. The expected
payment increases at an increasing rate as nitrogen
application rates are reduced from the baseline.
The minimum payment is zero in all the cases ex-
cept for the 50-pound reduction. The expected pay-
ment, maximum payment and the variance of the
payment increase with higher reductions in nitro-
gen application rates. The simulations demonstrate
that the expected total profit under non-
participation is less than that under participation
for all the reductions in nitrogen application rates
considered. Similarly the variance of the total prof-
its, V(n + 1) under participation is less than that
under non-participation. Among the nitrogen ap-
plication rates considered, the expected profit is the
highest when nitrogen application is reduced by 40
pounds from the baseline.
The simulation results also indicate that a farmer144 October 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Program Simulation under Scenario 1
E(1) Min(I) Max (1) E(m) E(T+I) Var



























































































50 1,43 i.60 11.60 7.24 284.12 285.55 3805.04 3725,64
*Non-participation,
participating in the program realizes a higher level
of expected profits even without an incentive pay-
ment as the nitrogen application rate is reduced.
This is because the baseline application rates could
be higher than the profit-maximizing level and so a
reduction in nitrogen application from the baseline
rates actually increases profhs. Participation also
reduces the variance of the total profits. This is
because nitrogen is treated as a risk increasing fac-
tor in the production function used in the EPIC
simulator. A second reason for the decrease in vari-
ability of total profits with reductions in nitrogen
application rates is the incentive program itself as
the program reduces the variability of total profits
by truncating the tails of the profit distribution.
Under the mean-variance criterion, a risk-averse
farmer is better-off by participating in the program.
The results further indicate that the variance of
profits without the incentive payment, V(m), is
greater than that with the incentive payment, V(T
+ I). The results are similar under the other three
scenarios considered and are presented in appendix
1. The second row in appendix 1 represents the
case when the timing of fertilizer application alone
is changed (less nitrogen applied in fall) with no
reduction in the total quantity of nitrogen applied.
Note that the expected payments are zero in
all these cases. The above results show that par-
ticipation mean-variance dominates the non-
participation in all the cases considered. Hence a
risk-averse farmer is better off by participating in
the simulated program under the mean-variance
criterion. Although spring application is less pol-
htting than in fall, farmers tend to apply nitrogen in
fall due to timeliness in spring. The spring season
is more time constrained and scheduling an appli-
cation with the spring rains may sometimes be dif-
ficult.
The results presented so far are based on a mix-
ture of the five soil types. The sponsor of the pro-
gram may want to target the program to soil types.
The participation response of farmers to such tar-
geted programs may also differ. In order to dem-
onstrate, the incentive program is simulated sepa-
rately for each of the five soil types (table 2). It is
assumed that the non-participating farmers apply
nitrogen at the baseline application rates and tim-
ings. In the case of Drummer and Catlin soils, the
expected payments based on the program devel-
oped for individual soil is in general higher than
the payments for the composite soil type. Hence, a
farmer with these soil types may prefer the incen-
tive program developed based on individual soil
types rather than based on the composite soil type.
The reverse is true in the case of Elliot, Sable and
Ashkum soils. As in the case of the composite soil,
participation mean-variance dominates non-
participation for all simulations with individual
soil types. However, it may be noted that the dif-
ferences in variance in some cases are very small.
The program requires that amount and time of
fertilizers applied by the participants have to be
observed, These could be observed in the case of
farmers who custom apply fertilizers and use com-
puterized application equipment. Hence, such
farmers could qualify to be participants. Another
factor that affects participation is the budget con-
straint of the program sponsor. The sponsor may
only have a limited budget and the budget con-
straint could define the number of farmers to be
enrolled in the program. The sponsor’s water qual-
ity objectives could be another factor that defines
participation. The water quality objectives could be
met, say, with a subset of farms enrolling in the
program.
An agency willing to sponsor such a program
may be interested in the mean and range in ex-
pected total costs it would have to incur, and theIpe et al. Farmer Adoption of Best Management Practices!46 October 2001 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Total Costs of Sponsoring the Program in the Lake Decatur Watershed (Dollars)
N Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Reduction
Scenario 4

















































































































































amount of reserves the agency needs to set aside as
reserve funds, In order to assess the costs of spon-
soring the program, the total area of the watershed
is approximated at 956,9 square miles (612.42
thousand acres). Out of the total watershed area
about 87% is under row crops (Demisie and Keefer
1996). Corn, which accounts for almost 50% of the
total area under row crops, is assumed to be 509Z0 of
the crop acres. The expected total cost and range in
total costs of sponsoring the program in the whole
watershed under each of the four different sce-
narios is presented in table 3. The program pay-
ments alone are considered to evaluate the total
costs. The costs tend to rise at an increasing rate as
the nitrogen application rate is reduced from the
baseline rate. The costs are the highest under sce-
nario 1. The total costs are zero for reduction in
nitrogen application rates up to 10 pounds per acre
under scenarios 2, 3, and 4. Further reductions in
nitrogen application rates increase the costs but are
less than those under scenario 1. These results in-
dicate that the proposed program may be more ef-
ficient when reduction in nitrogen application rate
is combined with changing the time of fertilizer
application.
Environmental Benefits
In order to evaluate the environmental impacts, the
reductions in annual emissions of nitrates per acre
under corn-soybean rotation and the effect of the
program on the nitrate concentration in the lake
water are analyzed.
Annual Emissions
The impact of the program on nitrate loading per
acre into surface water under the four alternative
scenarios is reported in table 4 (nitrate emissions
from corn acres alone are reported). The loadings
are annual averages based on forty years of simu-
lation. As nitrogen application rate is reduced from
the baseline, the average emissions first decreases
rapidly, but then later slows. A five-pound reduc-
tion in application rate from the baseline applica-
tion rate produces a reduction in loadings of
10,45% under scenario 1. Further reductions in
nitrogen application rates reduced emissions at a
decreasing rate, Reduction in nitrogen application
by 50 pounds per acre reduced emissions under
scenario 1 by 419Z0.Similar results are observed
under Scenarios 2, 3, and 4. Movement from sce-
nario 1 (7570 fall application and 25% spring ap-
plication) to scenario 2 (50% fall application and
5070 spring application) without any reduction in
nitrogen application rate reduces emissions by
10,87%. When the proportion of nitrogen applied
in fall is further reduced to 25% (75Y0 in spring)
the average annual emissions falls by 21% without
any reduction in nitrogen application rate. Simi-
larly, under scenario 4 (25% fall, 50% spring and
25% split application) the emissions are 23% less
than the baseline without any reduction in nitrogen
application rate. These results indicate that chang-
ing the time of fertilizer application alone without
any reduction in nitrogen application rate will sig-
nificantly reduce emissions.
It may be useful to compare the expected pay-
ment and the annual reduction in emissions under
the four different scenarios (table 5). Under sce-
nario 1 emission reduction up to 349’o could be
achieved by a 25-pound reduction in nitrogen ap-
plication with an expected program payment of
$0.34 per acre. Under scenarios 2, 3, and 4 ex-
pected payments are zero as application rate is re-
duced up to 10 pounds per acre. Under scenario 1,
when nitrogen application is reduced by 50 poundsIpe et al, Farmer Adoption of Best Management Practices 147
Table 4. Annual Average Emissions of
Nitrates (per/acre) into Surface Water
N
Reduction Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4




































































































*F]gures in parentheses are percentage reduction in emissions
compared to the baseline.
the expected payment is about $1.40 per acre and
the expected reduction in emissions is 41 Yo. Our
results indicate that the scenarios 2, 3, and 4 give
high abatement per dollar of expected cost.
The emissions from the drainage area of the lake
eventually reach the lake water. Hence, the success
of the program needs to be judged, in part, in terms
of its effect on the water quality in the lake. Since
nitrate pollution is seasonal with concentration ex-
ceeding the permissible levels mostly in spring, the
average weekly concentrations without and with
the program are simulated to analyze the effects of
the program. The daily emissions under all com-
binations of soil types, rotations, and fertilizer ap-
plication rates are first simulated using EPIC. The
daily emissions are then used as an input in the
nitrate delivery model (White et al. 1997) to cal-
culate the weekly average nitrate concentration in
the lake in each of the forty years simulated. The
probability that the weekly nitrate concentration
exceeds the 10 mg/liter is then computed as
(2) P(ccw> 10)=:,
where P is the probability, CCWis the weekly ni-
trate concentration (mg/1) in the lake water, and X
is the number of years in which the concentration
exceeds the 10 mg/1 level,
The results show that in general the nitrate con-
centration in the lake water reaches a peak level
during the spring, The probability that the weekly
nitrate concentration exceeds the 10 mg/1 level
when nitrogen application rates are at the baseline
and when the rates are reduced by 25 and 50
pounds under the four scenarios are presented in
table 6, The nonzero probabilities alone are re-
ported, Under scenario 1 the probability ranges
from O to 0.40 when nitrogen is applied at the
baseline rates. When the nitrogen application rate
is reduced by 25 pounds per acre, the correspond-
ing probabilityy ranges from Oto 0.28. When nitro-
gen application rates are reduced by 50 pounds per
acre from the baseline application rate, the prob-
abilities range from O to 0.20. Thus the results
show that the probabilities dropped by about 5090
as the nitrogen application rate is reduced by 50
pounds from the baseline. The average weekly ni-
trate concentrations also show similar patterns. At
the baseline application rate, it is highest (9.05 mg/
Table 5. Expected Payment and Expected Reduction in Annual Nitrate Emissions
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
N Payment % Emission % Emission ?10 Emission % Emission
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Table 6. Probability that the Nitrate Concentration in the Lake Water Exceeds 10 ppm;
Scenario 1
ScenariO1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
N Reduction N Reduction N Reduction N Reduction












































































0.00 0.03 0,00 0.00
0.00 0.03 0,00 0.00
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00
0.00 0.08 0.05 0.00
0,00 0.10 0.03 0.00
0.05 (),18 0.1o 0.08
0.10 0,23 0.18 0.1o
0.13 0.28 0.20 0,15
0.18 0.30 0.23 0,23
0.18 0.30 0.25 0,23
0.23 0.38 0.28 0.25
0.20 0.40 0.28 0.20
0.18 0.33 0.28 0.20
0.13 0.30 0.28 0.13
0.13 0.23 0.18 0.13
0.08 0.15 0.15 0.1o
0.08 0.13 0.08 0.08
0.03 0.08 0.08 0.03
0,03 0.08 0.08 0.05
0,00 0.03 0.03 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
0,00 0.03 0.03 0.00






























































































































*Probabilities are zero for all weeks other than those listed,
1)in the 20th week. As nitrogen application rate is
reduced by 50 pounds, the peak weekly average
nitrate concentration drops to 7.07 mg/1. The simu-
lations demonstrate similar results under the other
scenarios too. The results further indicate that the
program is more effective under scenarios 3 and 4.
This is because runoff of nitrogen fertilizers ap-
plied in fall is higher than that applied in spring or
side-dressed (Illinois Agronomy Handbook 1996).
Conclusions
The simulated program shows that a risk averse
farmer may be better off by participating in the
incentive program. The farmers may currently be
applying nitrogen fertilizers at rates above the
profit-maximizing levels. Hence reduction in nitro-
gen application rates actually increased farmer
profits and the sponsor of the program may not pay
for the initial reductions in nitrogen application
rates. Farmers may be too optimistic about the re-
sponse of profhs to nitrogen application, which in
turn result in application of nitrogen at rates higher
than the profit maximizing levels. Similar results
were obtained by Yadav (1997) and Bullock and
Bullock (1994). Our results show that reducing the
nitrogen application rate by up to about 35 pounds
does not reduce profits. Instead it may increase
profits as farmers currently maybe applying nitro-
gen at rates above the profit maximizing levels.
The proposed program increases farmer profits, re-
duces variance of profits, and reduces pollution,
while the sponsor does not pay for up to about a
35-pound reduction in nitrogen application. Thus,
the program will result in a win-win situation for
both the farmer and the sponsor. This incentive
program could be implemented as an educational
effort by promoting farmer experimentation. It is
unique in that the educational effort is backed by
an appropriate insurance mechanism to produce
the desired effect. The program could be imple-
mented as a short term demonstration program in
farmers’ fields. As farmers learn from their own
experimentation, it may result in a larger adoption
of sound management practices. Even if the pay-
ments are positive, the total program payments
may be much less than the costs of cleaning up the
polluted water. Thus, the farmer will benefit from
higher profits and reduced risk. The water supplyIpe et al Farmer Adoption of Best Management Practices 149
authority is better off because it is cheaper to
implement the incentive program than to clean up
the polluted water, and society benefits from the
overall improvement in water quality.
Our results, however, have the following limi-
tations. The program exploits correlated risks
across farmers in the watershed. The program
would become less effective as yields and risks
become less correlated. We have assumed that the
yields and prices are independent at the watershed
level, but there may be some relationship between
yields and national prices. Similarly, output price
variability could affect the farmer response. This
analysis is based on the assumption that all farmers
in the watershed would adopt the nitrogen fertilizer
management program. In the real world full par-
ticipation would not occur. When there is less than
full participation, one may not observe a linear
relationship between the extent of participation and
its impact on the water quality in the lake, although
partial participation will result in significant im-
provement of water quality in the lake.
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Appendix 1. Program Simulations Under Scenarios 2, 3, and 4
N Reducticm
Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4





















































































































































































F]gures in parentheses are variances.